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John Reifel, Ph.D., Associate Dean, Department of Economics, Seidman College of Business
Paul Thorsnes, Ph.D. Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand

Introduction
Most consumer goods have to stand the test of the market;
firms that price too high or produce goods of a quality that
is too low generally fair poorly. One might think that the
goods and services supplied by local governments avoid
the market test because governments can force us to pay
for them through our taxes. But Charles Tiebout, in an
influential article published in 1956, showed how local public
goods and services, such as public schools, police, and local
environmental quality, also have to withstand the rigors of
the market.
The idea is simple. Like private businesses, local governments
decide the quantity and quality of the goods and services they
supply to their customers; i.e., their constituents, and pay for
these goods and services at least in part with revenues from
local income, sales, and property taxes (they also receive
payments from higher levels of government). If a householder
doesn’t like the combination of public services and taxes
chosen by his elected representatives, he can either lobby for
change or pick up and move to another service district. If
enough people move out of a district, house prices fall, tax
revenues decline, and local officials find themselves in much
the same position as a private business that has made some
mistakes: revenues are below expectation and shareholders
are upset.
Tiebout hypothesized that if households are mobile enough
to be able to shop around for service districts in which to
live, then market pressure will be brought to bear on the
local agencies that supply the services. Those who want more
safety, cleaner streets, and higher quality public schools and
are able and willing to pay the higher local taxes required
will locate in cities that provide that mix. The market thereby
enforces discipline on local government agencies much as it
does on private businesses.
Of interest is the extent to which Tiebout’s hypothesis holds
water. Tests of household sorting by preferences for public
services can be either direct or indirect. The direct approach
involves surveys to see if householders’ preferences about the
quality and level of public services and taxes are relatively
similar within service districts and different across service
districts. The indirect approach takes advantage of the houseprice differentials that Tiebout sorting generates. Households
bid up house prices in districts that provide desirable
combinations of public services and taxes. So differences
across cities in the selling prices of otherwise similar houses
indirectly indicates Tiebout sorting.

Seidman Business Review • Winter 2006

The GR/EGR Housing Price Differential
We test for Tiebout sorting using both the indirect and direct
approaches by collecting both house price and survey data
from an unusual subdivision. The subdivision, called Ottawa
Hills, was platted in the early 1920s, occupies a nearly square
area of 160 acres, and contains 448 houses. The property was
a golf course prior to development, and its uniquely curved
streets were influenced by the original fairways. The original
lots in the subdivision were marketed to relatively wellheeled households, and the deeds included requirements for
minimum amounts to be spent on construction of the house.
The high quality of the houses and neighborhood distinguish
the subdivision from its somewhat older neighbors.
But it isn’t the subdivision’s high quality that attracted us, it’s
that the subdivision is neatly divided in half by municipal
and public school district boundaries. The subdivision is
bounded on its north and south sides by Franklin and Hall
and on its west and east sides by Giddings and Plymouth. The
boundary between the cities and school districts of Grand
Rapids (GR) and East Grand Rapids (EGR) evenly divide the
subdivision into two rectangular 80-acre parcels. Thus, we
have the opportunity to observe what has happened over a
long and interesting period of time to sets of very similar
houses in what are, at this point, very different public service
districts. To put it more technically, the subdivision allows
an unusually high level of control over the many house and
neighborhood characteristics that influence house prices.
We started by collecting data on house characteristics.
Information about the characteristics of the 448 houses in
the neighborhood was obtained from the Assessors’ Offices
in GR and EGR. Examination of that data led us to select a
sample of 100 similar houses on which we could concentrate
our study, 50 in GR and 50 in EGR. All of the sample houses
were built between 1923 and 1935, have two stories, at least
three bedrooms, brick veneer, and significant amounts of
ornamental trim. None of the houses are on the relatively
busy boundary streets and all are located north of Alexander
Road, since those built south of Alexander on the EGR side
are often newer and consist of more diverse architectural
styles. For the 100 houses in the sample, detailed information
was obtained on year built, lot size, floor space, number of
bathrooms, and garage size. Assessor records were also used
to update floor space due to renovations over time.
We then collected sale prices on the sample of houses. Price
data can be obtained from public records kept on file in
the County building, but is difficult to access. Fortunately,
TransNation Title Insurance Company has the data in a

more user-friendly format and agreed to let us peruse their
records and, as important, provided expert advice into how
to interpret the information on the records. We were able to
go back as far as 1949. Two of the houses did not sell over
the 53-year period, so they were dropped from the sample.
We found 359 arms-length (buyer and seller having different
surnames) sales for the 98 houses over the 1949–2002 period,
an average of 3.6 sales per house and almost 7 sales per year.
It surprised us that the rate of sales per year changed very
little over the 53-year time period.
The 1949 to 2002 time period is almost ideal for our
purposes. Grand Rapids expanded to provide urban services
to most unincorporated developing areas until the early
1960s. Ironically, suburban service districts were less
important when Tiebout published his paper than they are
now. This changed in the 1960s, when many households took
advantage of highway improvements to move to suburban
areas, thereby making room for an influx of relatively poor
households into the generally older central-city houses and
neighborhoods. Economists refer to this process as “filtering:”
houses tend to filter to relatively poorer households as
they age (the same thing happens with cars). Because
those moving to suburban areas preferred to form their
own services districts, the migration pattern created fiscal
distress for central cities that resulted in a relative decline
in the quality of the services they could provide. Thus, the
public services supplied to each side of the subdivision were
probably of similar quality prior to the 1960s, and have
probably differed since. Of interest is the corresponding
response in house prices.
Using statistical regression analysis, we constructed price
indices for a house with a standard set of characteristics on
each side of the subdivision. The price indices reveal that this
standard house sold for about the same amount on both sides
of the boundary up through the mid-1960s, consistent with
our hypothesis that the packages of city services and taxes
were about the same in GR and EGR at that time. Toward the
end of the 1960s, houses on the EGR side started rising in
price. In the mid-1970s house prices on the GR side began to
rise parallel to those in EGR. Since house prices on the EGR
side had begun rising earlier, they were selling at a premium.
That premium has varied around 40% of the price of a typical
house on the GR side, and the premium has persisted through
2002. The average selling prices for a typical house in the
early 2000s was about $259,000 on the GR side and about
$358,000 on the EGR side. The premium to live in EGR, just a
short walk away across an invisible line, is close to $100,000!
What does this premium signify? If the houses and
neighborhoods on each side of the boundary are indeed of
similar quality, then the premium appears to represent the
market value of the differences in public services and taxes
across the boundary. It turns out that tax rates are lower on
the GR side, even though city residents pay a city income tax

in addition to property taxes. So, for the households in this
market, the value of the difference in the quality of city and
school district services apparently exceeds $100,000!
Household Preferences
The price differential, taken by itself, provides indirect
evidence of Tiebout sorting. Householders who value,
especially highly, the public goods and services offered in
East Grand Rapids compete for houses in EGR by bidding up
their prices. Conversely, households who have less interest in
the characteristics of EGR public goods and services can get a
significant price break on the similarly nice houses in the GR
side of the Ottawa Hills subdivision.
We wanted to look more directly at the characteristics of
the households on each side of the subdivision. We started
by looking at the demographic characteristics reported in
the 2000 census block data. We expected to see significant
differences; for example, young and childless households and
retired couples might find the general location and house
quality desirable, but balk at the higher taxes and house prices
in EGR. Census demographics are almost identical on both
sides of the subdivision. The only difference is slightly more
racial diversity on the GR side. This is puzzling and a bit
troubling because researchers often use census demographics
as indicative of preferences to test Tiebout hypotheses.
We thought we might solve the puzzle by asking households
about their preferences. We sent a mail survey to 200
households, 100 on each side of the city boundary asking
about their preferences for key public services and why they
chose to live where they do. The 200 households consist of
the 100 whose houses were in the housing price analysis, and
another 100 households (50 on each side) selected randomly
from the north half of the subdivision. Response rates were
unusually high — 72% in GR and 68% in EGR.
Almost all of the EGR respondents reported that they
were attracted by the combination of high quality houses,
neighborhoods, and city services. Over 80% of the
respondents reported that they had selected their houses in
part so that they could send their children to the high quality
EGR public schools. This behavior is exactly what Tiebout
would expect: the city and school district are supplying a
set of services that appeal to a segment of the population
attracted to the types of houses and neighborhoods in EGR.
Taxes are high, but the high house prices indicate that both
current and potential residents consider them well spent.
The responses on the GR side reveal some similarities, but
also some glaring differences. As in EGR, almost all the
respondents were attracted by the high quality houses and
attractive neighborhood. Unlike EGR, many commented
on the relatively low price for the house and neighborhood
package. Some were attracted by the relative diversity in the
neighborhood and many like the strong sense of community
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in the neighborhood. Of interest, however, is that about 60%
of the households with children chose to send them most of
the time, to parochial schools (compared to less than 10%
in EGR). Most of these households reported that proximity
to parochial schools was an important attraction of the
neighborhood. About a third of those who sent their children
to public schools did so in the 1950s and 1960s, before the
decline of public school quality. Those currently with schoolage children often send them to GR public magnet schools
rather than to a neighborhood public school.
We see these results as rather strong and interesting evidence
of Tiebout sorting. The similar houses and neighborhoods
on each side of the boundary attract demographically similar
households, but the households who choose the GR side tend
to have weaker preferences especially for the characteristics
of EGR schools. Some of these households are retired or
childless. Many value the proximity to parochial or public
magnet schools. The market appears to have worked to
accommodate these differing preferences.
The Housing Price Differential Revisited
But what about the differences in the quality of city services?
It turns out that the residents on the GR side have formed
an active neighborhood association. The association lobbies
the city government for prompt delivery of public services,
conducts neighborhood clean-up campaigns, and holds an
annual neighborhood party, among other activities. The
quality of these services may not quite match those of EGR,
but they make up much of the difference.
These conclusions have implications for the interpretation
of the $100,000 house-price differential. The quality of the
services actually consumed by the households on the GR
side appears to roughly match that of the services on the
EGR side. Many of the households on the GR side make
tuition payments that are avoided by EGR residents. The
price differential compensates for these payments — the
higher cost of obtaining high-quality services on the GR side
capitalizes into house prices. This means, of course, that the
market value of the difference in the quality of GR and EGR
public services is even bigger than we initially thought: those
households willing to send their children to tuition-charging
schools were able to outbid those willing to consume GR
public services. The price differential would be bigger in
the absence of the parochial and magnet schools, though we
cannot tell how much bigger.

1 C.M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416–424 (1956).
2 We are indebted to Monte Reinert, Eilleen Mueller, and members of the staff at TransNation Title Insurance Company for their invaluable assistance.
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